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Abstract
Background: We examined the association of dialysis facility characteristics with payment reductions and change
in clinical performance measures during the first year of the United States Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) End Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Plan (ESRD QIP) to determine its potential impact on quality and
disparities in dialysis care.
Methods: We linked the 2012 ESRD QIP Facility Performance File to the 2007–2011 American Community Survey
by zip code and dichotomized the QIP total performance scores—derived from percent of patients with urea reduction
rate > 65, hemoglobin < 10 g/dL, and hemoglobin > 12 g/dL—as ‘any’ versus ‘no’ payment reduction. We characterized
associations between payment reduction and dialysis facility characteristics and neighborhood demographics, and
examined changes in facility outcomes between 2007 and 2010.
Results: In multivariable analysis, facilities with any payment reduction were more likely to have longer operation
(OR 1.03 per year), a medium or large number of stations (OR 1.31 and OR 1.42, respectively), and a larger proportion
of African Americans (OR 1.25, highest versus lowest quartile), all p < 0.05. Most improvement in clinical performance
was due to reduced overtreatment of anemia, a decline in the percentage of patients with hemoglobin ≥ 12 g/dL;
for-profits and facilities in African American neighborhoods had the greatest reduction.
Conclusions: In the first year of CMS pay-for-performance, most clinical improvement was due to reduced
overtreatment of anemia. Facilities in African American neighborhoods were more likely to receive a payment
reduction, despite their large decline in anemia overtreatment.
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Background
In 2012, the United States Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) reported outcomes for its
End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program
(ESRD QIP), a pay-for-performance (P4P) program for
dialysis facilities. The ESRD QIP is instructive as a case-
study of the ability of financial incentives to improve
quality and impact disparities, and the challenges of cre-
ating policy in changing clinical and policy contexts.
The ESRD QIP builds on prior efforts to improve the
quality and value of ESRD care. In 2001, CMS began
publicly reporting dialysis performance measures on
Dialysis Facility Compare, a public report card of facility
performance. In 2008, US Congress passed the Medicare
Improvements for Patients and Provider Act of 2008
(MIPPA) which established the ESRD QIP, a value-based
purchasing or P4P program for Medicare that began in
2012 [1]. MIPPA also bundled payments to dialysis facil-
ities starting in 2011 to reduce incentives to provide
expensive erythropoietin stimulating agents (ESAs) due
to high ESA costs and evidence of potential harms of
ESAs at high doses [2–5].
The ESRD QIP reduces Medicare ESRD payments to
dialysis facilities whose total performance scores do not
meet or exceed national standards. Facilities with a total
performance score less than 26 (out of a possible 30)
have their Medicare payments for dialysis services re-
duced on a sliding scale, ranging from 0.5% to a max-
imum of 2%. Total performance scores and payments
for 2012 are based on the dialysis facilities’ outcomes
from 2010 for dialysis adequacy (percentage of patients
* Correspondence: msaunder@medicine.bsd.uchicago.edu
1University of Chicago Medicine, 5841 S. Maryland, MC 2007, Chicago, IL
60637, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Saunders et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:816 
DOI 10.1186/s12913-017-2764-4
with urea reduction ratio ≥ 65) and inadequate anemia
management (both undertreatment, the percentage of
patients on ESAs with hemoglobin (Hgb) < 10 g/dL, and
overtreatment, the percentage of patients with Hgb >
12 g/dL).
Supporters of value-based purchasing or P4P pro-
grams contend that by measuring and reporting out-
comes and linking them to reimbursement, dialysis
facilities will have the data and motivation to improve
their quality of care. Achieving targeted hemoglobin and
dialysis adequacy is associated with decreased morbidity,
mortality, and improved quality of life [6–10]. Similarly,
randomized trials have shown that overtreatment of
anemia (Hgb greater than 12 g/dL) in patients with
chronic kidney disease is associated with increased
mortality, partly due to increased erythropoietin [3].
In addition, because these outcomes are publicly re-
ported online as part of Dialysis Facility Compare
[11], consumers could make informed choices about
dialysis facilities.
Critics counter that P4P might be ineffective in im-
proving quality of care or, worse, have unintended nega-
tive consequences. P4P could be ineffective if the money
at risk is not sufficient to encourage dialysis facilities to
improve quality [12]. P4P could also exacerbate dispar-
ities in dialysis quality [13]. Dialysis facilities in neigh-
borhoods with a higher proportion of African American
residents have performed less favorably on quality indi-
cators for anemia management and dialysis adequacy
[14, 15]. P4P could worsen disparities if dialysis facilities
“cherry-pick” healthier patients, leaving patients with
more medical or social disadvantage in low-performing
centers. P4P could also worsen racial or socioeconomic
disparities if poorly performing dialysis facilities are
chosen less by well-informed, well-insured patients, re-
ceive less reimbursement, and improve less than their
already high performing counterparts.
Thus we examined if quality improved and disparities
changed under QIP. First we explored what dialysis facil-
ity and neighborhood characteristics are associated with
total performance scores that led to payment reductions
under QIP. Then we investigated changes in QIP’s three
clinical performance measures between 2007 and 2010.
Methods
Data
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
2012 ESRD QIP Facility Performance contains informa-
tion on all CMS certified dialysis facilities about anemia
management and dialysis adequacy for 2010, metrics
used for P4P in fiscal year 2012.To obtain demographic
information for the neighborhood where the facility is
located, as well as for state and region, we linked the
CMS ESRD QIP file to the 2007–2011 American
Community Survey (ACS) five-year summary file facility
census tract by geocoding facility street address. We ex-
cluded facilities that did not have complete QIP score
information (n = 483, 8.7%). For the addresses for which
a street address could not be geocoded (n = 70, 1.3%), we
used the census tract based on the zipcode XY centroid
[16]. This study was deemed exempt by the IRB.
Outcomes and co-Variates
Outcome variables
In the ESRD QIP, facilities were given a 1–10 rating for
each of three criteria: the proportion of patients with
Hgb less than 10 g/dL, the proportion of patients with
Hgb greater than 12 g/dL (for the hemoglobin values, a
lower proportion gives a better score), and the propor-
tion of patients receiving adequate dialysis (urea reduc-
tion rate [URR] > 65%). Per QIP, the scores were
summed so each facility received a score between 1 and
30 which was translated to a five-category measure of
payment reduction for fiscal year 2012: (1) 0%, score
26–30; (2) 0.5%, score 21–25; (3) 1%, score 16–20; (4)
1.5%, score 11–15; and (5) 2%, score 10 or less.
We based our outcome measures on the ESRD QIP.
We reverse coded adequate dialysis to measure inad-
equate dialysis, URR < 65, so that the change between
2007 and 2010 would move in a consistent direction.
We collapsed 2% payment reduction into a category of
1.5% or more since there were few observations (n = 32).
To determine which dialysis facility characteristics were
associated with good and poor quality measures, we
transformed categorical variables to two dichotomous
outcome variables. Our first measure was ‘any payment
reduction’ versus ‘no payment reduction,’ where any pay-
ment reduction represented the payment reduction per-
centage of 0.5% or more (coded as 1) and no payment
reduction indicated 0% payment reduction (coded as 0).
Our second dichotomous outcome was ‘most payment
reduction’ versus ‘other payment reduction,’ where
most payment reduction was defined as payment re-
duction percentage of 1.5% or greater (coded as 1)
and other payment reduction was defined as 1% or
smaller (coded as 0).
An additional outcome was change over time of the
clinical outcome. To assess direct effects of QIP on
quality improvement, we compared 2007 and 2010
performance for each dialysis facility on each of the
three QIP outcomes.
Co-variates
We examined dialysis facility and neighborhood charac-
teristics while accounting for ESRD network. Network
describes the 18 ESRD Networks which are regional en-
tities that contract with CMS and are responsible for
organization, health planning, and quality improvement
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for ESRD care. Dialysis facility characteristics included
profit status (i.e., for-profit versus non-profit), chain type
(i.e., non-chain (independent), Chain 1, Chain 2, versus
all other chains), facility size (i.e., the total number of
dialysis stations at the dialysis facility by tertile), and
years of operation (i.e., years since CMS certification).
Chain membership is an organizational structure where
a single firm owns a number of dialysis facilities, defined
by USRDS as 20 or more freestanding facilities.
Measures of dialysis facility neighborhood context were
based on census tract. Census tract is the most com-
monly accepted proxy for neighborhood within social
science and health services research [17]. Dialysis facility
neighborhood-level characteristics included percentage
of African American and percentage of population below
Federal Poverty Level to represent neighborhood socio-
economic context [14, 15]. These variables were right-
skewed; therefore, we divided them into quartiles to
create categorical variables. All categorical variables
(number of stations by tertile, percent African American
by quartile, and percent poverty by quartile) were ana-
lyzed as indicator variables.
Statistical analysis
Data were summed using descriptive statistics. We used
a generalized linear mixed effects model to examine as-
sociations between each outcome and dialysis facility
characteristics (facility type, length of operation, total
number of stations) and facility neighborhood demo-
graphics (percent African American and percent of
population below Federal Poverty Level by quartile).
Each covariate of interest was evaluated separately in
bivariable analyses; then they were examined simultan-
eously in multivariate analyses. We used logistic regres-
sion for binary outcomes (any payment reduction and
no payment reduction); we used linear regression for
paired data for change in clinical outcomes over time.
All models included a random effect for ESRD network
to account for clustering. We considered an interaction
term between neighborhood demographics (proportion
African American and proportion below poverty) for any
payment reduction and large payment reduction because
prior work showed different outcomes in African
American and non-African American poor neighbor-
hoods [15, 18]. All analyses were conducted using Stata,
version 12.0 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX).
Results
Baseline characteristics
Of 5089 CMS certified dialysis facilities, the majority
were for-profit (82.6%) and part of a chain (79.0%),
Table 1. The average dialysis facility had 18 stations and
had been operating for 15 years, although there was
wide variation. On average, facilities were located in
neighborhoods that were 18.2% African American,
though this distribution was right skewed; mean pro-
portion African American was less than 1% in Quartile 1
and 54% in Quartile 4. The facilities had a mean
QIP score of 26.3, and 70.4% of facilities had 0%
payment reduction.
Bi-variable and multi-variable association between any
payment reduction and facility and neighborhood covariates
In bivariable analysis compared to other chains (Table 2),
two large chains were less likely to have any payment re-
duction (Chain 1, OR 0.78, 95% CI [0.66, 0.92]; Chain 2,
OR 0.84, 95% CI [0.71, 1.0]). Conversely, dialysis facil-
ities with any payment reduction were more likely to
have had longer length of operation (OR 1.04 per year,
95% CI [1.03, 1.04]) and a medium or large number of
stations (OR 1.41, 95% CI [1.21, 1.64] and OR 1.81, 95%
CI [1.54, 2.12], compared to small). Similarly, facilities in
neighborhoods with greatest proportion of poverty (OR
1.42, 95% CI [1.19, 1.70], highest quartile versus lowest
quartile) and greatest proportion of African Americans
(OR 1.52, 95% CI [1.26, 1.83], highest quartile versus
lowest quartile) were also more likely to be in the pay-
ment reduction group.
In multivariable analysis (Table 2), dialysis facilities
with any payment reductions were more likely to have
longer operation (OR 1.03 per year, 95% CI [1.03, 1.04])
and a medium or large number of stations (OR 1.31,
95% CI [1.11, 1.52] and OR 1.42, 95% CI [1.20, 1.69],
compared to small). Similarly, facilities in neighborhoods
with greater proportion of African Americans (highest
versus lowest quartile, OR 1.25, 95% CI [1.02, 1.54])
were still more likely to be in the payment reduction
group, even after controlling for percent poverty. The
two large national chains, Chain 1 and Chain 2, were
significantly less likely to have a payment reduction
compared to other chains (OR 0.77, 95% CI [0.65–0.91]
and OR 0.74, 95% CI [0.62, 0.88], respectively).
Bi-variable and multi-variable association between greatest
payment reduction and facility and neighborhood
Appendix Table 5 shows factors associated with being in
the greatest payment reduction group ≥1.5%, the worst
category. In bivariable analysis, facilities with longer
length of operation (OR 1.02 per year, 95% CI [1.01,
1.03]) were more likely to be in the worst (≥1.5%) pay-
ment reduction group. Conversely, two national chains
(Chain 1 OR 0.56, 95% CI [0.41, 0.75] and Chain 2, OR
0.73, 95% CI [0.55, 0.96]) had lower odds of being in the
greatest payment reduction group.
In multivariable analysis, facilities with longer length
of operation (OR 1.02 per year, 95% CI [1.00, 1.03]) were
more likely to be in the greatest (≥1.5%) payment reduc-
tion group. Conversely, two large national chains, Chain
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1 and Chain 2 (OR 0.56, 95% CI [0.41, 0.76] and OR
0.69, 95% CI [0.52, 0.91], respectively) had lower odds of
being in the greatest payment reduction group compared
to other chains. There was no significant interaction be-
tween neighborhood demographics (proportion African
American and proportion below poverty) and between
these variables and ESRD network (analysis not shown).
Change in clinical outcomes between 2007 and 2010 and
facility and neighborhood covariates
Table 3 shows mean change in clinical outcomes be-
tween 2007 and 2010 by facility and neighborhood.
Across most categories, there was a small increase in
percent of patients with Hgb below 10 g/dL, which
indicates anemia undertreatment. There was a signifi-
cant difference between change in Hgb < 10 between the
no payment reduction group which showed a small re-
duction in proportion with Hgb < 10 and any payment
reduction groups that show a successive increase in pro-
portion with Hgb < 10. In addition, most facilities saw a
small decrease in percent of patients with inadequate
dialysis. The largest change in clinical outcomes from
2007 to 2010 is reduced anemia overtreatment shown by
a decrease in proportion of patients with Hgb greater
than 12 g/dL. Two large national chains had larger mean
change compared to other chains or non-chains (inde-
pendent) (−43.6 and −32.3 versus −30.9 and −27.4, re-
spectively, p < 0.05).
Table 1 Baseline characteristics of hemodialysis facilities overall and by pay-for-performance payment group








N (% of total) 5089 3580 (70.3%) 811 (15.9%) 289 (5.7%) 409 (8.0%)
Facility level characteristics
For-Profit (% For-Profit by Payment Group)a 4205 2991 672 235 307
82.6% 83.6% 82.9% 81.3% 75.1%
Chain (% Chain by Payment Group)a 3676 2611 588 217 260
79.0% 79.9% 79.0% 81.6% 68.8%
Chain 1 1321 968 220 60 73
26.0% 27.1% 27.1% 20.8% 17.9%
Chain 2 1291 917 196 80 98





















Size (#stations)a 17.63 17.15 19.36 19.74 18.63































Length of Operation 14.65 13.74 16.82 17.35 16.43
years (95% CIs)a [14.4, 14.9] [13.4,14.02 [16.2,17.4] [16.3,18.4] [15.6,17.3]
Neighborhood level characteristics (mean, 95% CIs)
Percent African Americana 18.2% 17.0% 20.9% 22.5% 20.6%
[17.5,18.8] [16.3,17.8] [19.1, 22.6] [19.4, 25.5] [18.0, 23.1]
Percent Poverty 18.5% 15.8% 16.7% 17.1% 17.5%
[18.1,18.8] [15.8,16.1] [16.1,17.3] [16.0,18.2] [16.5,18.5]
Outcomes (mean, 95% CIs)










ap < 0.05, difference across groups. *Pay-for-Performance Payment Categories: Total Performance Score (TPS) 26–30, 0% payment reduction; TPS 21–25, 0.5%
payment reduction; TPS 16–20, 1% payment reduction; TPS less than 15, payment reduction ≥1.5%
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Table 4 shows multivariable results of facility and
neighborhood characteristics associated with clinical
outcomes over time. After adjusting for other factors,
chain type (i.e., Chain 1) was associated with clinical im-
provement across all categories. Similarly, neighbor-
hoods with greatest proportion of African Americans
had significant improvement in two categories, decrease
in percent of patients with Hgb > 12 g/dL and decreased
percentage of patients with urea reduction rate less than
65. An analysis (not shown) examining random effects
within our two-level model demonstrated larger vari-
ation our outcomes between facilities than between net-
work. For example, for urea reduction rate less than 65
the network variance is 0.17 while the residual (facility)
variance is 33.4. For Hgb > 12 g/dL, network variance is
0.03 and facility variance is 7.2; for Hgb < 10 g/dL net-
work variance is 18.4 and facility variance is 408.1. The
residual variance for facility was larger than for network
across all three outcomes.
Discussion
The first year of P4P for dialysis facilities has been a
qualified success in the US. Several positive results are
suggested by our data. The majority of dialysis facilities
met CMS quality benchmarks related to dialysis ad-
equacy and hemoglobin management and did not re-
ceive a payment reduction in 2012. However, total
performance standards set for the 2012 payment year
were modest at best. The measurement standards are
based either on 2008 national benchmarks for each out-
come or the actual 2007 results for each provider,
whichever is lower. Thus, lower performing facilities
were able to use their 2007 results for the baseline rather
than being held to national performance standards.
Other clinical and regulatory forces were also at work.
Announcements in 2008 about ESRD QIP and bundled
payment, which reduced incentives to provide expensive
erythropoietin stimulating agents (ESAs), occurred at
the same time as evidence mounted of potential harms
of ESAs at high doses [2, 3, 5]. High doses of ESAs to
reach high hemoglobin levels were associated with
greater risk for stroke, thromboembolic events, cardio-
vascular events, all-cause mortality and potentially
cancer [2, 3, 5]. In 2007, the US Federal Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) issued a black-box warning for ESAs
which called for using the lowest possible dose. As a re-
sult, many professional bodies changed their guidelines
for ESA dosing for ESRD-related anemia [19–21].
Additionally, since 2001 CMS had been requiring dialy-
sis facilities to monitor and report their outcomes. It is
unclear whether the process of monitoring and report-
ing, or anticipating the potential financial penalties for
QIP or bundled payment, led to improvement. Regard-
less of that uncertainty, a larger proportion of patients in
dialysis facilities received guideline recommended care,
which will likely lead to better clinical outcomes.
For-profit facilities were less likely to have received
any payment reduction and were less likely to be in the
largest payment reduction group. Those successes were
largely due to two large national chains that represent
more than half of US dialysis facilities. These large
chains may have been better able to develop and dissem-
inate effective clinical monitoring systems and clinical
protocols. Our work found that the largest improvement
was reduction in anemia overtreatment, and this change
was significantly larger for Chain 1, a large for-profit na-
tional chain. Chain 1 also had small improvements in
the two other categories (anemia undertreatment and
dialysis adequacy). In prior work, for-profit facilities
were associated with anemia overtreatment, higher than
recommended hematocrit, and larger doses of
erythropoietin-stimulating agents (ESAs), even after the
FDA black box warning about ESAs’ harms at high doses
[22, 23]. Adherence to clinical guidelines for ESAs,
Table 2 Bi-Variate and multi-variate association between any




Co-Variates OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Facility level characteristics
Chain Type
Other Chain Referent Referent
Chain 1 0.78a [0.66, 0.92] 0.77a [0.65, 0.91]
Chain 2 0.84a [0.71, 1.00] 0.74a [0.62, 0.88]
Independent 1.01 [0.85, 1.21] 0.94 [0.78, 1.13]
Total # Stations (per station)
Low (0–13) Referent Referent
Medium (14–20) 1.41a [1.21, 1.65] 1.30a [1.11, 1.53]
High (21–80) 1.81a [1.54, 2.12] 1.42a [1.20, 1.69]
Length of Operation (per year) 1.04a [1.03, 1.04] 1.03a [1.03, 1.04]
Neighborhood Level Characteristics
Percent African-American
Quartile 1≤ 8.6% Referent Referent
Quartile 2 8.6%–15.7% 1.07 [0.90, 1.28] 1.01 [0.84, 1.21]
Quartile 3 15.7% -25% 1.29a [1.08, 1.55] 1.15 [0.96, 1.39]
Quartile 4 > 25% 1.52a [1.26, 1.83] 1.25a [1.02, 1.54]
Percent Below Federal Poverty Level
Quartile 1≤ 1.7% Referent Referent
Quartile 2 1.7% - 7.2% 1.16 [0.98, 1.39] 1.08 [0.90, 1.29]
Quartile 3 7.2% - 24.9% 1.18a [0.99, 1.41] 1.06 [0.88, 1.28]
Quartile 4 > 24.7% 1.42a [1.19, 1.70] 1.15 [0.95, 1.39]
ap < 0.05. Multivariable model includes profit status, number of stations by
tertile, length of operation, and both percent African American and percent
below Federal Poverty Level by facility neighborhood by quartile. Confidence
intervals are at the 95% significance level
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anticipation of bundled payments to facilities which now
include ESAs, and QIP may have all contributed to this
decline in anemia overtreatment [3, 5, 24, 25]. However,
this result demonstrates how aligning payments—both
bundled payments and ESRD QIP—with desired clinical
outcomes can motivate capable organizations to change
their practices.
When evaluating whether ESRD QIP increases dispar-
ities in quality, the evidence is also mixed. Facilities in
predominately African American communities showed
the greatest reduction in percent of patients overtreated
for anemia and a more modest increase in percent of pa-
tients with adequate dialysis. Despite these improve-
ments, in absolute terms, facilities in predominately
African American neighborhoods still had lower total
performance scores. ESRD QIP rewards absolute per-
formance rather than relative improvement. Thus, the
likelihood of a facility receiving any payment reduction
increased as proportion of African Americans in the
neighborhood increased, even after controlling for
neighborhood poverty. Our work is consistent with the
growing body of literature that recognizes neighborhood
context (i.e., poverty or racial composition) as a con-
tributor to disparities in quality of care for patients
with ESRD [14, 18, 26]. The challenge of ESRD QIP,
similar to other P4P programs, is how to incentivize
quality improvement without widening quality or pay-
ment disparities [27, 28].
Efforts are underway to determine if and how to ac-
count for social factors that may lead to poor health care
outcomes (e.g. low education, racial minority status, resi-
dence in disadvantaged neighborhood) in P4P programs
without accepting lower quality for individuals in those
groups [28]. Two distinct methods—risk adjustment and
payment adjustment—attempt to measure and improve
quality, while taking social factors into account to avoid
unfairly penalizing particular providers or institutions.
Risk adjustment determines what clinical and social fac-
tors should be accounted for when reporting outcomes;
that is the quality benchmarks may be differ but payment
Table 3 Mean change in clinical performance 2007–2010 by facility and neighborhood, and performance-level characteristics
Variable Mean Change in
Hgb <10 g/dL [95% CI]b
Mean Change in
Hgb > 12 g/dL [95% CI]b
Change in
URR < 65 [95% CI]c
N (%) 4259 4259 4191
All facilities 1.36 [1.25, 1.47] −33.87 [−34.52, −33.22] −0.80 [−0.97, −0.62]
Facility Level Characteristics
Chain
Others 1.57 [1.36, 1.78] −30.94 [−32.25, −29.64] −0.97 [−1.36, −0.57]
Chain 1 1.18 [1.00, 1.36] −43.63a [−44.75,-42.53] −0.25a [−0.54, 0.04]
Chain 2 1.25 [1.05, 1.45] −32.32a [−33.37,-32.27] −0.96 [−1.24, −0.68]
Independent 1.42 [1.11, 1.73] −27.39a [−28.94,-25.84] −1.03 [−1.51, −0.55]
Neighborhood Level Characteristics (mean, 95% CIs)
Percent African-American
Quartile 1≤ 8.6% 1.27 [1.03, 1.50] −30.85 [−32.21, −29.49] −0.32 [0.67, 0.04]
Quartile 2 8.6%–15.7% 1.32 [1.11, 1.53] −33.01 [−34.26, −31.76] −0.96 [−1.42, −0.51]
Quartile 3 15.7% -25% 1.47 [1.26, 1.69] −34.97a [−36.26,-33.68] −0.80 [−1.12, −0.48]
Quartile 4 > 25% 1.36 [1.14, 1.58] −36.48a [−37.73,-35.22] −1.06a [−1.35, −0.76]
Percent Below Federal Poverty Level
Quartile 1≤ 1.7% 1.31 [1.09, 1.53] −33.19 [−34.50, −31.89] −0.86 [−1.16, −0.55]
Quartile 2 1.7% - 7.2% 1.38 [1.16, 1.60] −33.81 [−35.11, −32.52] −0.79 [−1.16, −0.42]
Quartile 3 7.2% - 24.9% 1.30 [1.09, 1.50] −34.52 [−35.83, −33.20] −0.76 [−1.16, −0.37]
Quartile 4 > 24.7% 1.42 [1.18, 1.66] −34.05 [−35.31, −32.79] −0.76 [−1.12, −0.41]
Payment Reduction
1 0% −0.16 [−0.26, −0.06] −34.50 [−35.38, −33.82] −1.58 [−1.78, −1.37]
2 0.5% 2.27a [2.09, 2.45] −32.28 [−33.91, −30.65] 0.39a [−0.04, 0.81]
3 1% 4.16a [3.98, 4.35] −33.13 [−35.80, −30.46] 1.11a [0.51, 1.72]
4≥ 1.5% 7.78a [7.44, 8.11] −32.63 [−34.64, −30.62] 0.69a [−0.04, 1.42]
aSignificant Difference, p < 0.05 based on ANOVA. bHemoglobin (Hgb) goals: 10 ≤ Hgb ≤ 12, so decreasing proportion less than 10 or greater than 12 is a positive
change. cAdequate dialysis is Urea Reduction Rate (URR) greater than or equal to 65, so increasing proportion is positive change. Confidence intervals are at the
95% significance level
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for reaching one’s designated benchmark is the same.
Payment adjustment sets the same quality benchmark for
every institution, but adjusts payment based on account-
ing for clinical or social factors. The payments can be
based risk adjusted, increased after accounting for social
factors, or can directly fund programs to improve the
quality of care for disadvantaged patients.
Our analyses have limitations. First, our study was ob-
servational. While our work shows that facility and
neighborhood variation exists in quality of care, the eti-
ology of this variation is still unclear. Further work is
needed to examine how staff attitudes and practices, pa-
tient characteristics, and facility-level processes vary by
high- and low-performers as well as by facility type,
neighborhood, and region. In addition, our measures of
dialysis facility neighborhood context were limited to
census tracts. Dialysis facilities may be affected by pa-
tients and employees from a larger catchment area, and
our outcomes may be more dependent on larger com-
munity infrastructure and resources [29]. In addition,
patients in dialysis facilities may have greater disad-
vantage than the surrounding area as measured by
percent African American and poverty [14]. Finally,
we accounted for the effect of ESRD network overall,
but we did not examine payment reductions by spe-
cific ESRD networks, states, or counties. While vari-
ation within these smaller areas may exist, we found
that a greater proportion of variation in facility out-
comes was explained by facility-level characteristics
rather than region.
Conclusions
Pay-for-performance has arrived for dialysis facilities in
the US. Centers are likely reassured that this policy-
change is not draconian; the majority of centers received
no payment reduction. CMS policy makers are likely
pleased at the improvement in anemia management.
Most of the improvement appeared to be due to reduced
anemia overtreatment without a large increase in anemia
undertreatment. However, reports of the early successes
Table 4 Multivariable regression for change in clinical performance 2007–2010 by facility and neighborhood co-variates
Co-Variates Change in Hgb
<10 g/dL [95% CI]b
Change in Hgb
> 12 g/dL [95% CI]b
Change in URR




Other chain Referent Referent Referent
Chain 1 −0.38a [−0.68, −0.67] −12.69a [−14.41, −10.98] 0.91a [0.42, 1.41]
Chain 2 −0.41a [−0.72, −0.10] −0.46 [−2.19, 1.26] 0.14 [−0.35, 0.64]
Independent −0.08 [−0.41, 0.26] 3.72a [1.84, 5.59] −0.06 [−0.60, 0.49]
Total # Stations (per station)
Low (0–13) Referent Referent Referent
Medium (14–20) −0.11 [−0.39, 0.17] 0.12 [−0.47, 1.70] −0.33 [−0.79, 0.14]
High (21–80) 0.11 [−0.20, 0.42] 0.77 [−0.96, 2.49] −0.37 [−0.87, 0.13]
Length of Operation (per year) 0.02a [0.00, 0.03] 0.03 [−0.04, 0.11] −0.003 [−0.03, 0.02]
Neighborhood Level Characteristics
Percent African-American
Quartile 1≤ 8.6% Referent Referent Referent
Quartile 2 8.6%–15.7% 0.07 [−0.25, 0.39] −1.22 [−3.00, 0.57] −0.63a [−1.15, −0.11]
Quartile 3 15.7% −25% 0.19 [−0.12, 0.55] -2.42a [−4.29, −0.54] −0.53a [−1.07, 0.01]
Quartile 4 > 24.7% 0.04 [−0.29, 0.45] −3.43a [−5.52, −1.34] −0.85a [−1.05, −0.27]
Percent Below Federal Poverty Level
Quartile 1≤ 1.7% Referent Referent Referent
Quartile 2 1.7% - 7.2% 0.06 [−0.25, 0.38] −0.33 [−2.08, 1.43] 0.09 [−0.42, 0.60]
Quartile 3 7.2% - 24.9% 0.04 [−0.28, 0.37] −0.53 [−2.35, 1.29] 0.19 [−0.34, 0.71]
Quartile 4 > 24.7% 0.13 [−0.21, 0.47] 0.80 [−1.10, 2.71] 0.30 [−0.25, 0.85]
ap < 0.05. bHemoglobin (Hgb) goals: 10 ≤Hgb ≤ 12, so decreasing proportion less than 10 or greater than 12 (negative sign) is a positive clinical change. cInadequate
dialysis is Urea Reduction Rate (URR) <65 so decreasing proportion of URR < 65 (negative sign) is a positive clinical change. Confidence intervals are at the 95%
significance level. Multivariable model includes profit status, total number of stations (by tertile), length of operation, percent African American by facility
neighborhood (by quartile), percent below Federal Poverty Level by facility neighborhood (by quartile)
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of ESRD QIP must be tempered with caution. The large
improvement in anemia management occurred with the
concomitant incentives of P4P, anticipation of bundled
payment for ESAs, and mounting clinical evidence of
the potential harms of ESAs. In addition, facilities in
largely African American communities still fared worse
in this new era of P4P, despite significant quality im-
provement on dialysis adequacy and anemia overtreat-
ment. In subsequent years, disparities may widen in the
ESRD QIP as CMS increases the number of clinical out-
comes measured and raises the thresholds that need to
be met [30]. Outcomes must continue to be monitored
to ensure that the program effectively improves quality




ACS: American community survey; CMS: Centers for medicare and medicaid
services; ESA: Erythropoietin stimulating agent; ESRD: End stage renal disease;
Hgb: Hemoglobin; MIPPA: Medicare improvements for patients and provider
act of 2008; P4P: Pay-for-performance; QIP: Quality incentive plan
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